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SIGNAL STRENGTH, MEDIA ATTENTION, AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION: 
EVIDENCE FROM NEW PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Past research has shown that new firms can facilitate resource mobilization by signaling their 
unobservable quality to prospective resource providers. However, we know less about situations 
in which firms convey multiple signals of different strengths—i.e., signals that are more or less 
correlated with unobservable firm quality. Building on a sociocognitive perspective, we propose 
that prospective resource providers respond differently to signals of different strengths and that 
the effectiveness of signals, especially weak signals, will be contingent on the media attention 
new firms receive. Empirically, we conduct a longitudinal analysis examining the ability of new 
private equity (PE) firms to raise a follow-on fund. Consistent with our theory, we find that 
unrealized performance, a relatively weak signal, positively influences fundraising. But we fail to 
find statistical evidence that its effect is weaker than that of realized performance, a relatively 
strong signal. Further, media attention strengthens the relationship between unrealized 
performance and fundraising, but media attention exerts less impact on the relationship between 
realized performance and fundraising. Taken together, our findings deepen our understanding of 
how new firms can mobilize resources with signals of different strengths and of how the media—
as a key information intermediary—differently impacts their effectiveness. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Resource mobilization is a challenge for all firms, but this challenge is especially acute for new 
firms (Clough et al., 2019; Stinchcombe, 1965). One reason is that new firms face high levels of 
uncertainty about their future prospects (Sanders and Boivie, 2004). Another reason is that large 
information asymmetries between new firms of uncertain quality and prospective resource 
providers make the latter reluctant to contribute their valuable and scarce resources to the former 
(Akerlof, 1970; Stuart et al., 1999). Despite these heightened challenges, new firms must find 
ways to mobilize resources to ensure their survival (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). 
 One influential perspective that addresses this resource mobilization challenge is 
signaling theory (Spence, 1973; 2002), which holds that high-quality firms signal their 
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unobservable quality with observable attributes that are costly or difficult to imitate by low-
quality firms. Management scholars generally invoke variants of signaling theory that are broader 
and less formal than the traditional economic perspective associated with the ―Spencian‖ 
approach. As Clough and colleagues observe (2011: 248), ―the term ‗signal‘ describes any 
informational characteristic that credibly indicates [a firm‘s] underlying quality‖. For example, 
research in management shows that firms can signal their quality with board characteristics 
(Certo, 2003), team characteristics (Higgins and Gulati, 2006; Plummer et al., 2016), early 
accomplishments (Hallen, 2008) and endorsement relationships (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; 
Plummer et al., 2016; Reuer et al., 2012; Ozmel et al., 2013; Stuart et al., 1999), among other 
attributes, to convince prospective resource providers to contribute their scarce resources to these 
firms (See also Bergh et al. (2014) and Connelly et al. (2011) for reviews of the signaling 
literature in management). 
At the same time, less is known about situations in which firms convey multiple 
simultaneous signals (Drover et al., 2018; Steigenberger and Wilhelm, 2018). As Drover and 
colleagues (2018: 210) observe, ―signaling theory research, as formulated by Spence and those 
who followed, does not adequately explain how individuals allocate attention to or interpret 
multiple signals‖. Among the issues that arise in connection with multiple signals, for example, is 
that signals may be stronger or weaker depending on ―the extent to which the signal is correlated 
with unobservable quality‖ (Connelly et al., 2011: 53). However, past research has not explained 
how prospective resource providers respond to multiple simultaneous signals of different 
strengths.  
This is an important issue for several reasons. First, there is growing theoretical 
recognition that signal transmission is not an ―automatic‖ process but instead requires that signals 
be received and processed by signal receivers operating in complex information environments 
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(Bergh et al., 2014; Bitektine, 2011; Drover et al., 2018). For example, ―most real-world settings 
feature a wild assortment of possible stimuli and cues‖ (Felin et al., 2017: 1056), and within such 
contexts the same firm may convey multiple signals (Stern et al., 2014; Plummer et al., 2016). In 
light of these considerations, there is a need for empirical studies to account for a broader range 
of informational cues than have historically been considered (Jensen et al., 2012; Steigenberger 
and Wilhelm, 2018).  
Second, there is a need to account more fully for variations in the way receivers attend to 
and interpret specific signals owing to differences among signals as well the influence exerted by 
elements of the signaling environment or context (Connelly et al., 2011; Kim and Jensen, 2014). 
For example, while signaling research has generally focused on signals that are argued to be 
strong, a more limited set of research has argued that signals are not uniformly strong but rather 
exist on a continuum of varying strengths (e.g., Gemser et al., 2008; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; 
Park and Mezias, 2005). Nevertheless, Bergh et al. (2014) observed that none of the studies in 
their extensive literature review provided direct evidence of signal strength. Moreover, as 
Connelly and colleagues (2011: 62) observed, the ―signaling environment is on the whole an 
underresearched aspect of signaling theory‖ even though there is evidence that managers‘ 
attention and decision making can be affected by various aspects of their information 
environments (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001; Shroff et al., 2013). 
Third, signals of varying strengths are likely to be especially important to account for in 
entrepreneurial settings, where new firms—owing to their newness and uncertainty—often find 
themselves without the historical and external bases of evidence that can signal the quality of 
more established firms (Petkova, 2012). Indeed, many new firms find themselves in a catch-22 
situation: prominent affiliates could serve as a strong signal, for example, but such affiliates 
themselves rely on signals to decide which new firms to contribute their scarce resources to 
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(Martens et al., 2007). To the extent that weaker signals may represent an avenue of escape from 
such situations, it behooves us to better understand how resource providers attend to weaker 
signals. 
In this paper, we advance the management literature on signaling by new firms by 
examining how multiple simultaneous signals of different strengths impact resource provision 
decisions. Bergh and colleagues (2014: 1347) proposed that in order to shed light on such issues, 
scholars ―could integrate ideas from signaling theory with other information processing 
perspectives‖. Consistent with this advice, we adopt a sociocognitive perspective (Bitektine, 
2011; Pollock and Rindova, 2003), which, ―is … rooted in a bounded rationality view of strategic 
decision makers who satisfy rather than optimize performance outcomes, as they rely on 
heuristics and cognitive simplifications to cope with uncertainty and cognitive overload‖ 
(Rindova et al., 2012: 5). Drawing on this perspective, we propose that weak signals help new 
firms attract resources from resource providers but that weak signals will be less impactful in 
doing so than strong signals. Moreover, building on past sociocognitive work that has highlighted 
the influence of information intermediaries on evaluators‘ attention and evaluations (e.g., Petkova 
et al., 2013; Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Pollock et al., 2008; Rindova et al., 2012), we propose 
that the media attention new firms receive will strengthen the relationship between weak signals 
and resource attraction, but that media attention will exert less impact on the effectiveness of 
strong signals. Thus, whereas past research has tended to overlook or downplay the social context 
in which signaling occurs (Steigenberger and Wilhelm, 2018), our approach explores whether 
and how characteristics of the signaling environment may influence the effectiveness of signals. 
We investigate our claims in the context of new private equity (PE) firms that manage 
their first-time fund but need to raise a follow-on fund to remain in business, given the limited 
lifetime of PE funds. This context is replete with information asymmetry and uncertainty (Balboa 
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and Marti, 2007; Sahlman, 1990), and—unsurprisingly—many new PE firms fail to raise a 
second fund (Rider and Swaminathan, 2012). Within this context, we focus on performance-
related signals: specifically, the realized and unrealized performance of the PE firms‘ first-time 
funds. Below, we argue and show that both types of performance signals differ in signal strength, 
with unrealized performance representing a weaker signal and realized performance representing 
a stronger signal. Unlike some other signals, such as those that reference a new firm‘s social ties 
or human capital, which require resource providers to draw inferences linking some factor or set 
of factors with the firm‘s capacity to perform over time, these signals speak directly to the new 
firm‘s own capacity to perform, which is the consideration of most interest to investors and many 
other resource providers.  
We use longitudinal data to investigate the ability of 205 first-time PE funds to raise a 
follow-on fund. As expected, we find that higher unrealized performance fosters fundraising. 
Although qualitative comparisons indicate that weak signals are indeed economically less 
impactful than strong signals, we fail to find statistical evidence that the effect of unrealized 
performance is weaker than the effect of realized performance. Further, consistent with our 
expectations, we find that the effect of unrealized performance on fundraising is significantly 
stronger for PE firms that attract more media attention, whereas media attention is less impactful 
for the relationship between realized performance and fundraising.  
Our primary contribution is to the management literature on how new firms use signaling 
to attract resources. Empirically, we add to this literature by providing evidence that firms convey 
signals of different strengths, that weaker signals can also aid in resource attraction, and that 
information intermediaries (e.g., the media) can amplify the effectiveness of weaker signals. 
Theoretically, we enrich this literature by proposing sociocognitive explanations for these effects 
that complement and extend recent management research on how new firms‘ resource attraction 
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prospects are shaped by the ways in which resource providers receive and process information 
(Hallen and Pahnke, 2016; Steigenberger and Wilhelm, 2018; Vanacker and Forbes, 2016).  
THE RESEARCH CONTEXT: PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDRAISING 
PE firms, including venture capital (VC) and buyout firms, are specialized financial 
intermediaries which usually invest in the equity of privately held companies (Cumming and 
Walz, 2010; Wright and Robbie, 1998). Our study focuses on independent PE firms, which are 
not linked to any parent organization, such as corporate PE funds. We do so because independent 
PE firms have to raise funds from external investors while corporate PE funds get their funding 
from parent companies, making resource mobilization inherently different.  
Independent PE firms are typically organized as limited liability partnerships, whereby 
general partners (GPs) manage the PE funds and limited partners (LPs) provide the funds. LPs 
typically include institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds 
as well as governments, sovereign wealth funds, corporations, family offices, and private 
individuals (Sahlman, 1990; Sammut, 2011). The legal life of most PE funds is set at 10 years, 
implying that the aim is to sell or exit funds‘ assets and distribute the proceeds to LPs before the 
10-year time period, although provisions are often included to extend the life of funds by two 
years (Dimov and Gedajlovic, 2010; Sahlman, 1990). Each fund moves through various stages 
(Sammut, 2011). During the investment period stage, usually the first four years after establishing 
a fund, investment targets are sought and the investment portfolio is formed. During the maturity 
stage, some three to seven years after establishing a fund, follow-on financing rounds may be 
provided to the portfolio companies in order to further support their growth. Finally, in the 
harvest or liquidation stage, generally from five years after establishing a fund to the end of a 
fund‘s life, GPs are focused on exiting their investments through IPOs, trade sales or secondary 
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buyouts, thereby turning their illiquid stakes in privately held companies into realized returns and 
returning the proceeds to the LPs. 
Given the finite lifetime of independent PE funds, GPs need to raise new funds from LPs 
on a regular basis to continue their activities. GPs typically engage in fundraising activities to 
establish a new fund some three to five years after the start of their previous fund (Sahlman, 
1990), which corresponds with the end of the previous fund‘s investment period (Rider and 
Swaminathan, 2012). Failing to find sufficient investors for a follow-on fund will prevent GPs 
from continuing their investment activities in new portfolio companies and will eventually lead to 
the end of the PE firm (Freeman, 2005). A large percentage of PE firms fail to raise a second 
fund and thereby eventually ―exit‖ the market or experience mortality (Rider and Swaminathan, 
2012). This high mortality rate is not surprising because the relationship between PE managers 
and their (prospective) capital providers is characterized by significant information asymmetries 
(Balboa and Marti, 2007; Sahlman, 1990). The ultimate performance of a PE fund is only known 
once all investments have been exited and the cash is returned to investors, at the end of the 
lifetime of the fund (Cumming and Walz, 2010). This situation is particularly problematic for 
new PE firms, which need to raise follow-on funds at the end of the investment period of their 
first fund, often well before having exited their investments and hence before having 
demonstrated significant realized performance. Overall, the PE firm setting allows us to examine 
resource acquisition in a setting where information asymmetry problems between new firms and 
prospective resource providers are particularly severe. 
We focus on different performance-related signals (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990) that 
could reduce prospective capital providers‘ informational disadvantages and uncertainty with 
respect to the quality of new PE firms. Performance-related signals can relate to both realized and 
unrealized performance. Realized performance—i.e., performance to which a definitive value has 
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been assigned—has been shown to be a strong predictor of a firm‘s ability to attract additional 
resources (Cumming et al., 2005; Hallen, 2008). Past realized performance is also a strong 
predictor of future performance (Bromiley, 1991) and thus represents a strong signal. In our 
context, PE managers of first-time funds realize returns by exiting their investments in private 
companies. Successful exits signal PE managers are good ―scouts‖ and ―coaches‖ (Baum and 
Silverman, 2004), and these exits are extremely difficult to imitate by low ability PE managers. 
Consequently, realized performance is also expected to be a strong signal within the PE context. 
However, a track record of realized performance is often unavailable for new PE firms 
(even those of high quality). PE firms therefore also signal their ―unrealized performance‖, which 
refers to their valuation of equity stakes that are still to be exited (potentially many years ahead). 
These valuations rely heavily on estimates, forecasts, or promises; they are determined by the 
GPs and usually certified by external auditors. It is undeniably harder for PE firms with poor 
investments to present good unrealized performance than it is for a PE firm with good 
investments, which makes unrealized performance a signal as well. Still, unrealized performance 
is expected to be a weaker signal than realized performance. Indeed, unrealized performance 
remains a specific form of non-binding communication by PE managers that is inevitably 
subjective. For example, Jenkinson and colleagues (2013) identified significant differences in the 
independently reported unrealized performance by separate fund managers, who jointly invested 
in the same company. Further, research has shown that PE managers‘ valuations of private 
portfolio companies that are not yet exited are positively biased, especially when they are in 
fundraising mode (Cumming and Walz, 2010). Several LPs we interviewed confirmed these 
insights from previous research. Below, we will use insights and quotes from these interviews to 
substantiate and enrich our theoretical claims. More information on the interviews can be found 
in Appendix 1. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
To understand how prospective resource providers assess unobservable firm quality to inform 
their resource provision decisions in an environment characterized by informational asymmetry 
and uncertainty, scholars have often drawn on signaling theory (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 
1973). Within the signaling literature, scholars have tended to implicitly assume that the specific 
signal under investigation is strong. However, some recent literature calls attention to the 
possibility that firms may convey multiple signals (Drover et al., 2018).  
For example, research has shown that investors consider multiple firm actions or 
attributes in deciding whether to provide resources to a firm (Lee, 2001; Stern et al., 2014). 
Consideration of multiple signals raises the question of whether signals sent simultaneously by a 
firm differ in strength. Past research has argued that signal strength can vary over time (e.g., 
Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Park and Mezias, 2005), but ―empirical research comparing different 
types of quality signals remains scarce‖ (Gemser et al. 2008: 45). The question of how resource 
providers respond to multiple signals of varying strengths is especially salient in entrepreneurial 
settings, where conditions of uncertainty and information asymmetry are particularly acute. For 
example, new firms often lack the track records and external endorsements through which more 
established firms often signal their quality (Petkova, 2012). Accordingly, we ask whether and 
when signals of different strengths influence resource attraction by new ventures. 
Although the origins of signaling theory lie in economics (Spence, 1973), management 
scholars have adopted a broader set of theoretical assumptions regarding the way signal receivers 
process information, thereby ―circumventing the limitation of signaling theory, which clearly sees 
actors as rational agents‖ (Bergh et al., 2014: 1354). For example, management scholars have 
called attention to the fact that signal receivers do not perceive all signals equally. This 
observation is particularly true in entrepreneurial settings, since ―there are many more early stage, 
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than late stage, firms in which to invest, so potential investors need to process a wider range of 
information‖ (Plummer et al., 2016: 1586). Moreover, in entrepreneurial settings, careful 
consideration of individual investment alternatives is costly and time-consuming (Wiltbank, 
2005). Similarly, in contrast to the traditional assumption that ―signals are noticed and/or 
attended to by almost everyone‖ (Drover et al., 2018: 210), management scholars have begun to 
explore aspects of the signaling environment that may ―make signals more or less observable‖ 
(Connelly et al., 2011: 62). Taken together, these considerations underscore the limits of the 
traditional, ―mechanistic understanding of signaling‖ (Connelly et al, 2011: 61), and point 
towards the need for a broader theoretical perspective that pays more attention to the process by 
which signal receivers notice, use, and interpret signals. 
In response to this need, we adopt a sociocognitive perspective on the signaling process 
(e.g., Rindova et al., 2012). This perspective has two key implications. First, we maintain that 
new firms‘ signals do indeed matter to resource providers but that resource providers tend to 
gather and analyze information in ways that reflect the constraints they face (Gavetti et al., 2007; 
Hallen and Pahnke, 2016; Vanacker and Forbes, 2016). Specifically, we maintain that 
prospective capital providers in new PE firms, like decision-makers in many other contexts, are 
boundedly rational and, therefore, ―tend to make decisions on the basis of effort-preserving, but 
sometimes fallible, cognitive heuristics‖ (Hallen and Pahnke, 2016: 1537). Second, in contrast to 
the conventional approach to signaling, which tends to focus exclusively on the interaction 
between senders and receivers of signals, the sociocognitive perspective maintains that the social 
context in which receivers are situated can influence whether and how they attend to specific 
signals (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001; Rindova et al., 2012). More specifically, this approach 
highlights the important role played by information intermediaries, such as the media, in affecting 
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the way decision-makers attend to and process specific signals (Pollock and Rindova, 2003; 
Rindova et al., 2012; Zuckerman, 1999). 
Signals of Different Strengths and Fundraising 
The idea that strong signals facilitate resource mobilization is well-established (Hallen, 2008). 
Also, in our context of PE fundraising, there is considerable evidence that realized performance, a 
strong signal, positively influences fundraising success (e.g., Cumming et al., 2005). Thus, we 
start by theorizing about the impact of unrealized performance, a comparatively weak signal, on 
the likelihood that first-time PE funds raise a follow-on fund. We propose that higher unrealized 
performance will positively influence prospective capital providers‘ resource provision decisions.  
One reason higher unrealized performance is likely to influence prospective capital 
providers is that it can enable firms to call attention to themselves and thereby enter into 
investors‘ ―consideration set‖. Prospective capital providers are generally faced with many 
alternatives from which to choose as well as with constraints in terms of staffing and time. 
Accordingly, they must simplify their investment decisions with a ―consider-then-choose‖ 
decision process. This process entails that prospective capital providers will first identify a subset 
of firms, the ―consideration set‖ (Jensen and Roy, 2008), for further evaluation, and then choose 
from among the firms in this set. As Petkova et al. (2013: 866) note: ―being considered, therefore, 
precedes being evaluated‖. The importance of entering into a consideration set has been 
illustrated in multiple markets, including consumer (e.g., Hauser, 2014), labor (e.g., Williamson, 
2000), and financial markets (e.g., Merton, 1987; Petkova et al., 2013; Pollock et al., 2008). In 
financial markets, for instance, Merton (1987) suggests that investors‘ consideration set includes 
firms that have caught their limited attention and that they only evaluate such firms. 
In our context, where many alternative PE firms exist, it is unlikely that any one 
prospective capital provider will actively consider all investment options. LPs generally use 
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commercial databases (such as Preqin) in conjunction with other sources, which universally 
include records of performance, to identify the universe of possible investment options (e.g., 
Preqin, 2014; Boivin et al., 2019). This claim is also confirmed by our interviewees. For the 
reasons explained above, LPs cannot include all these PE firms in their consideration set. We 
expect that prospective capital providers will rely on signals to help identify new PE firms that 
merit closer attention. Thus, unrealized performance is likely to serve as a signal that can draw 
the attention of prospective resource providers to new PE firms.  
In particular, we expect that new PE firms with higher levels of unrealized performance 
will be more likely to be drawn into prospective capital providers‘ investment consideration set. 
We maintain this expectation even as we acknowledge that unrealized performance is a relatively 
weak signal (compared to realized performance). One reason for our expectation is that even for 
new PE firms of high quality, much of their value will be unrealized at the time of their 
fundraising. Our interviews indeed indicate that LPs use performance data to identify firms that 
require further investigation and that unrealized performance affects which firms enter into the 
consideration set. As one LP noted: ―If a firm has realized performance, it helps. However, 
unrealized performance is not to be neglected as many firms approach us three or four years after 
their first fundraising. At that time, it is difficult for them to have exits, so we consider where 
firms rank in terms of unrealized performance‖. Another LP confirmed: ―There must be some 
indication of performance, either realized or unrealized. Having realized some hard exits helps 
but is not required … all these things are not carved in stone‖.  
A second reason higher unrealized performance is likely to influence prospective capital 
providers is that it may influence their evaluation processes as well. The unrealized performance 
of first-time funds is likely to function as an ―anchor‖ in these evaluation processes such that PE 
funds with higher levels of unrealized performance will induce decision-makers to arrive at more 
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favorable conclusions about the prospects of these funds. Indeed, there is evidence that 
information cues provided early in an evaluation process can produce an anchoring effect, a 
―biased estimate toward an arbitrary value considered by judges before making a numerical 
estimate‖ (Strack and Mussweiler, 1997: 437). This effect has been shown to operate in 
connection with valuation and performance tasks (Ariely et al., 2003; Thorsteinson et al., 2008), 
and the effect has even been observed with expert evaluators and in situations in which 
alternative information is abundant. For instance, Northcraft and Neale (1987) show that 
manipulated listing prices anchor values assigned to real estate properties, even for expert real 
estate agents who received a detailed information package and toured the property.  
Clearly, PE managers cannot just put any value on their portfolio of unrealized 
investments. These are typically audited by qualified external auditors (Barber and Yasuda, 2017) 
and LPs conduct their own detailed due diligence on them. For example, the LPs we interviewed 
described assigning their own valuations based upon talks with portfolio companies and other 
industry contacts, independent auditor valuations, or a comparison of the unrealized valuation by 
one GP with that of another GP in case of syndicated investments. Awareness of this due 
diligence process, as well as broader reputational concerns, are expected to provide some 
discipline to PE managers that report their unrealized performance.  
However, due diligence is incapable of truly ―verifying‖ unrealized performance (Kerr et 
al., 2014), and a good valuation is not a point estimate but rather a credible valuation range 
(Damodaran, 2006) from which PE managers can still select a value from the upper bound. 
Consistent with these ideas, there is evidence that PE managers provide unrealized performance 
estimates that are on average positively biased, especially when they are in fundraising mode 
(Barber and Yasuda, 2017; Cumming and Walz, 2010). One LP we interviewed noted: ―It does 
happen that, upon fundraising, the value of the unrealized portfolio is somewhat inflated, but GPs 
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also realize they have to be careful and not overdo it‖. Overall, when PE managers provide higher 
unrealized performance estimates that are within a credibility window, these are likely to serve as 
an anchor and prompt LPs to arrive at more favorable valuations as well. In fact, Northcraft and 
Neale (1987) show that even when an anchor is outside a credibility window, it can still 
positively influence the valuations of experts.
1
 Thus, 
Hypothesis 1. Higher unrealized performance of first-time funds will increase the 
likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. 
We have argued that unrealized performance, a weaker signal, will positively influence 
investors‘ resource provision decisions. Past research has also established that realized 
performance, a stronger signal, will positively influence investors‘ resource provision decisions 
(Cumming et al., 2005; Hallen, 2008). Below, we propose that prospective resource providers 
will differently attend to and evaluate these signals of different strengths, such that the impact of 
the weaker signal, i.e. unrealized performance, on fundraising will be weaker than that of the 
stronger signal, i.e. realized performance.
 2
   
One reason is that some demonstration of realized performance is a highly sought-after 
characteristic of new PE funds given its higher signal strength relative to unrealized performance. 
An LP told us ―We prefer, of course, hard exits, so distributions [i.e., realized performance] 
                                                          
1
 One may wonder why expert decision-makers do not learn (enough) from their mistakes in the past. There is 
evidence that even experts often do not learn from their fallible judgments because of other cognitive biases or 
limitations. Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001), for instance, argue that delayed feedback combined with recall biases 
and decision-makers‘ tendency to engage in post hoc rationalizations are likely to constrain learning. In our context, 
unrealized performance can indeed take many years to turn into realized performance, making some of these 
problems more acute. Northcarft and Neale (1987) further show that experts are less likely to admit (or to 
understand) that they use anchors in their decision making, relative to amateurs. 
2
 Next to comparing the effectiveness of signals of different strength, one may also wonder whether these signals 
interact. Past work shows that independent signals do interact (e.g., Plummer et al., 2016; Ozmel et al., 2013). 
However, our signals are not independent. Specifically, within PE funds, when realized performance increases, all 
else equal, unrealized performance should decrease. Moreover, within PE funds, realized performance can only 
remain stable or increase over time. Consequently, combinations where both realized performance and unrealized 
performance increase or decrease are rare to impossible. These considerations explain why we do not hypothesize an 
interaction effect. We did run models that include an interaction effect between unrealized performance and realized 
performance but the interaction effect was not significant. 
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instead of just a high residual value [i.e., unrealized performance]‖. Hence, higher levels of 
realized performance are likely to be especially influential in bringing new PE firms into the 
consideration set of prospective capital providers. When discussing how LPs attend to the 
performance of first-time PE funds, one LP indicated: ―if they already have a ‗winner‘ then it‘s 
an easy one‖. Consistent with these ideas, research in marketing has shown that while there are 
many different decision rules that may guide the formation of consideration sets, ―top-ranked‖ 
characteristics (i.e., realized performance in this context) are especially influential in doing so 
(e.g., Hauser, 2014).  
A second reason is that during the evaluation or due diligence phase, realized 
performance can be easily verified because it is factual data based upon hard outcomes, as 
opposed to expectations or estimates. Realized performance is a direct indicator of a firm‘s early 
accomplishments (e.g., Hallen, 2008) and, more specifically, in our context, it shows PE 
managers‘ ability to select promising companies, build these companies and exit them. While 
there is always a possibility for honest disagreement with respect to the unrealized performance 
of first-time funds, this is not the case for their realized performance. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2. The impact of higher unrealized performance of first-time funds on the 
likelihood of raising a follow-on fund will be weaker than the impact of higher realized 
performance. 
The Moderating Influence of Media Attention 
So far, we have assumed that prospective resource providers respond to signals of different 
strengths independently of the social context firms are in. However, consistent with our 
sociocognitive perspective, we recognize that aspects of the signaling environment can also 
influence the effectiveness with which signals are transmitted (Connelly et al., 2011). Among the 
most important elements of the environment are those that are liable to affect the observability of 
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signals, or the ―degree to which a signal is easily attended to by an organizational outsider‖ 
(Drover et al., 2018: 217). Owing to the central role that media sources play as information 
intermediaries in many markets, media attention has been recognized as a key environmental 
factor that can affect managers‘ decisions (Rindova et al., 2012; Shroff et al., 2013). 
New ventures with higher levels of media attention are more likely to become known by 
prospective capital providers (Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Vanacker and Forbes, 2016). ―Being 
known‖ is often viewed as a crucial factor that helps firms enter into resource providers‘ 
consideration set (Williamson, 2000). Consistent with this claim, one LP we interviewed 
remarked, ―if the name sounds familiar and if we have read about them [in the media]… then the 
file is more likely to be analyzed‖. Accordingly, we argue that the attention new firms receive 
from the media will strengthen the impact of these firms‘ unrealized performance on their ability 
to mobilize resources.  
The expectation that new PE firms with higher unrealized performance will be more 
likely to enter into prospective resource providers‘ consideration set and raise a second fund, as 
we discussed before, is predicated on the assumption that the signals sent by each individual PE 
firm are equally likely to be received and used by resource providers: that ―if a signal is provided, 
the appropriate actor will naturally attend to it and use it‖ (Pollock and Gulati, 2007: 340). 
Nevertheless, as Pollock and Gulati (2007: 340) further highlight, much ―less attention has been 
paid to how … signals increase a firm‘s likelihood of inclusion in the ‗consideration sets‘‖ of 
resource providers. Thus, even in cases where new PE firms report high levels of unrealized 
performance, those performance signals could remain unnoticed or unused by prospective capital 
providers, especially if the reporting firms are new PE firms that are less known. Media coverage 
of the reporting PE firms may mitigate this risk.  
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As many PE firms report unrealized performance, LPs cannot investigate in detail all 
firms that report higher unrealized performance. The media attention new firms receive might 
help them (and their signals) to stand out from the crowd (Petkova, 2012). Thus, we anticipate 
that prospective capital providers will be more likely to notice and use the high unrealized 
performance signals of new PE firms that attract more media attention. Conversely, claims of 
high unrealized performance by new PE firms that attract less media attention are more likely to 
remain unnoticed or unused by prospective capital providers, given their cognitive limitations.  
 At the same time, we expect that firms‘ media attention will strengthen the ―anchoring‖ 
effects we discussed earlier. Firms that attract more media attention will be viewed as more 
legitimate (e.g., Petkova et al., 2013; Pollock and Rindova, 2003). This effect is consistent with 
the well-established psychological ―mere exposure effect‖ (Pollock and Rindova, 2003). This 
effect holds that the mere repeated exposure of people to a stimulus object (e.g., a firm) is a 
sufficient condition for them to make the stimulus more liked (Harrison 1977, Zajonc 1968) and 
thus more legitimate. The anchoring literature highlights that a more legitimate source of 
information (i.e., the firms legitimized by the media attention they received) can create stronger 
anchoring effects (van Exel et al., 2006). Thus,  
Hypothesis 3. Media attention will positively moderate the relationship between higher 
unrealized performance of first-time funds and the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. 
Finally, media attention is likely to exert a stronger moderating influence on the effect of 
unrealized performance, than on the effect of realized performance, on fundraising. As with 
unrealized performance, media attention may help new PE firms to draw LPs‘ attention to their 
higher realized performance signals and as such become more likely to enter into investors‘ 
consideration set (e.g., Pollock and Gulati, 2007), especially in a setting where many PE firms 
(including established firms) convey reports of realized performance. However, contrary to the 
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role of media attention in strengthening the anchoring effect of unrealized performance in the 
evaluation phase, realized performance encompasses definitive values, as opposed to the 
estimated values represented by unrealized performance. Consequently, when evaluating realized 
performance, it should not a priori matter whether realized performance is communicated by a 
firm that is viewed as more or less legitimate as a consequence of its media attention. Thus,  
Hypothesis 4. Media attention will more positively moderate the relationship between 
higher unrealized performance of first-time funds and the likelihood of raising a follow-
on fund than the relationship between realized performance and the likelihood of raising 
a follow-on fund. 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
The data for this study come from the Preqin database, which combines fundraising and 
performance data for a variety of investment funds, including VC, buyout, real estate and hedge 
funds. In this study, we consider the two major types of PE funds, namely VC and buyout funds 
(Wright and Robbie, 1998). Preqin‘s fund performance database covers over 5,800 funds 
managed by some 1,900 PE firms from all over the world. Preqin indicates their database 
includes over 60% of all capital raised historically. Preqin collects its data through direct 
engagement with industry participants (i.e., GPs and LPs), through Freedom of Information 
Laws, and by monitoring other data sources, including regulatory filings, press releases, news, 
and websites. Many Preqin subscribers are institutional investors, who use the database to search 
for investment opportunities. For instance, the Preqin investor network includes over 7,800 
investment professionals, and there are over 20,000 logins monthly from these investors.
3
 Studies 
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into the Preqin performance data indicate that they are current, do not appear to be selected, and 
are unlikely affected by appreciable bias (e.g., Harris et al., 2014; Kaplan and Lerner, 2016).  
 We selected all new PE firms that raised their first fund between 1999 and 2007 and 
collected data for these firms/funds up to December 2017. New PE firms that raised their first 
fund after 2007 are not included in our data for two reasons. First, we wanted to ensure that all 
PE firms had enough time to raise a second fund over the timeframe of our study.
4
 Second, we 
required data on the eventual realized performance of first-time funds at the end of their 
economic life, which typically is 10 years after their establishment, to confirm that our 
independent variables are signals characterized by different signal strength. This selection 
resulted in a dataset of 321 new PE firms. We incorporated measures for each firm-year entry 
between 1999 and 2017. Firm-year observations were censored for years where new PE firms 
were no longer ―at risk‖ of raising a second fund, that is, those years after PE firms raised a 
follow-on fund or when the age of the PE firm‘s initial fund exceeds 13 years and no follow-on 
fund was raised.
5
 We removed those firm-year entries for which essential data, including 





Our dependent variable, raising a follow-on fund, is dummy coded. The dummy variable equals 1 
when a new PE firm i raises a follow-on fund in a focal year t, and 0 otherwise. This variable is 
theoretically relevant because it directly relates to the ability of PE managers to overcome 
                                                          
4
 For those PE firms that raised a follow-on fund, the average (median) PE firm required 4 (3) years to do so, while 
one PE firm required 11 years. 
5
 This 13 years cut-off covers the typical 10 years economic life time of funds and common provisions to extend 
their life with an additional two years. PE firms are unlikely to be at risk of raising a follow-on fund after the life of 
their first fund. Our results remain robust without employing this exclusion criterion. 
6
 This drop out is common when using standard PE databases. For instance, in Zarutskie (2010) the sample size 
decreases from 318 to 222 first-time VC funds when additional data is required for the analysis. 
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resource mobilization challenges. More specifically, it captures the ability of PE managers to 
raise new financial resources from prospective capital providers and thereby remain in business; a 
challenge that many PE managers cannot overcome given significant information asymmetry and 
uncertainty in this context (Rider and Swaminathan, 2012). Our decision to focus on the ability to 
raise a follow-on fund—rather than, for example, on the size of the follow-on fund—is also 
motivated by two additional observations. First, the size of the follow-on fund can only be 
observed for the ―successful‖ PE firms that raised a follow-on fund. Second, raising a follow-on 
fund is critical for all PE managers, who need to raise new funds on a regular basis to continue 
their activities given the limited life of PE funds. However, not all PE managers—such as those 
managing specialized, ―boutique‖ PE firms—strive to raise larger funds.7  
Our independent variables include unrealized performance and realized performance. 
Preqin provides guidelines to GPs in order to ensure consistent performance reporting. All 




Unrealized performance is defined as the valuation of unrealized investments and is 
reported as a percentage of called capital in a focal year t of the first-time fund. The value of 
unrealized investments represents an estimate of the amount at which an asset could be acquired 
or sold in a transaction; however, it represents uncertain returns on paper, as actual returns are 
only realized at exit, which might be many years away. Values of unrealized performance range 
between 0% and 1,782%, with a mean value of 74.26% (S.D. = 88.14%). We take the natural 
logarithm of unrealized performance (e.g., Shaver, 2007), because of the decreasing value of an 
                                                          
7
 For those PE managers that raised a second fund, we find that the correlation between the size of the first fund and 
the size of the second fund is 0.92.  
8
 There is the possibility that retrospective edits will be made to the performance data but only when errors come to 
light or GPs wish to amend what they previously reported. However, Preqin has confirmed that such backwards 
revisions of the data are extremely rare. 
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additional unit of unrealized performance. This transformation also has the advantage that it 
decreases the probability that extreme observations will affect the findings. 
Realized performance is defined as distributions to the LPs up to a focal year t as a 
percentage of called capital of the first-time fund. Realized performance represents the returns 
that LP investors in a fund receive (Wright and Robbie, 1998). It is the income and capital (less 
expenses and liabilities) realized from exiting investments by way of an initial public offering, 
acquisition or another form of exit. Values of realized performance range between 0% and 
1,782%, with a mean value of 49.04% (S.D. = 108.45%). As with unrealized performance, we 
take the natural logarithm of realized performance.  
We construct a moderator variable capturing the media attention towards PE firms 
managing their first fund, using the ProQuest Global Newsstream database. This database covers 
over 2,800 news sources including newspapers, news websites, and blogs from leading 
publishers. ProQuest provides one of the largest collections of news from the US, Canada, 
Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Australia. ProQuest incorporates the US Newsstream, 
Canadian Newsstream, and International Newsstream databases. It also includes the Factiva 
database. The database is commonly used to construct measures of media attention (e.g., Bednar, 
2012; Bednar et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014; McDonnell and King, 2013). We define media 
attention as the number of citations in ProQuest to a specific PE firm in t-1. By doing so, we 
avoid the risk that our measure includes media coverage as a consequence of PE firms raising a 
follow-on fund. PE firm media attention ranges between 0 and 495, with a mean value of 9.5. We 
take the natural logarithm of media attention because of the decreasing value of an additional unit 
of media attention (e.g., Pollock and Rindova, 2003).
9
 We further include the interactions 
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 Consistent with our theorizing, we focus on media attention, which is important in its own right (e.g., Petkova et al., 
2013). We acknowledge that media attention may also have a specific tenor (e.g., positive or negative). However, in 
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We control for time-varying PE firm/fund characteristics. Fund age is defined as the 
difference between t and the vintage year of the first fund. We also include fund age squared to 
control for a possible non-linear relationship between firm age and fundraising (e.g., Gompers 
and Lerner, 1998). Further, PE fund age controls for the fact that unrealized and realized 
performance are not equally important throughout the lifecycle of a PE fund. A young PE fund 
has by design a low unrealized and realized performance because the companies in the portfolio 
will not have had the time to create value yet and the number of realized investments (or exits) 
will be limited. As a PE fund ages, its realized value will increase monotonously over time as 
more investments are exited. While its unrealized performance may increase in a first phase due 
to the increase in value of the companies in its portfolio, it will decrease at the end of the life of 
the fund, as most investments will be exited and generate realized value; little unrealized value 
will thereby remain in the fund. Called capital is defined as the proportion of capital that has 
been called on the total amount committed. Controlling for called capital is relevant as LPs 
typically do not invest the total amount committed at the start of a PE fund. Instead, GPs will call 
fractions of the committed capital when needed for investment purposes. When PE fund 
managers experience difficulties in finding interesting investment projects and called capital thus 
remains low, PE managers may be constrained in raising a second fund. 
To control for macroeconomic evolutions, we include a time-varying ratio of PE raised 
on GDP. This variable allows to control for the cyclical nature of fundraising in PE markets 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
line with the observations made by Dimov et al. (2007), media coverage in the PE context can be expected to be 
rather neutral. In order to verify this assumption, we carefully examined a random sample of 50 articles and found 
these articles to be largely descriptive and neutral. 
10
 For all variables where we include interaction terms we mean centered the variables (e.g., Kutner et al., 2005). 
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(Gompers and Lerner, 1998). Specifically, we calculated the ratio of PE raised to GDP for the US 
economy. We use statistics for the US because the bulk of PE firms in our sample are located in 
the US. Moreover, PE markets in other regions around the world typically follow the evolution of 
fundraising in the US market. We further include the yearly S&P500 return to control for the 
public equity market conditions. Finally, we include calendar year dummies to further control for 
the effects of any general economic event or trend. 
We also collected data on first-time PE fund characteristics that do not vary over time. 
These data are used throughout our descriptive statistics and some regressions but are not 
incorporated in our main regressions because, as we detail below, these models already control 
for all stable PE firm characteristics by including PE firm fixed effects. We make a distinction 
between VC and buyout funds. We dummy code venture capital equal to 1 when the PE fund is a 
VC fund, and 0 when it is a buyout fund. Fund size is calculated as the natural logarithm of total 
capital raised by the PE firm (in million, dollars) for its first-time fund. We also capture the 
primary geographical investment focus of the first-time PE funds. We make a broad distinction 
between a primary geographical investment focus in the US, Europe or the rest of the world. PE 
funds with a US investment focus are used as the reference category. We also measure GP 
location. We make a broad distinction between the location of GPs in the US, Europe or the rest 
of the world. PE firms located in the US are used as the reference category. The US PE market is 
generally considered to be the most developed PE market around the globe. We further collected 
data on PE fund industry focus. We create dummy variables, using predefined Preqin categories, 
indicating whether or not PE fund managers consider investments in agriculture and chemical 
materials, business and industrial products/services, consumer products/services and retail, 
energy and environment, financial services, information and communication technology, life 
sciences, and other industries. These categories are not mutually exclusive because PE funds can 
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take a generalist approach and target several of these sectors. Finally, the vintage year of a fund is 
the year in which the first capital is called for investment. 
Econometric Approach 
We estimate Linear Probability Models (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Ganco et al., 2015) with 
PE firm fixed effects and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, clustered at the PE firm 
level. These fixed effects models have the attractive feature of controlling for all stable 
characteristics of PE firms, whether measured or not, which is accomplished by using only 
within-PE firm variation to estimate the regression coefficients. Thus, the PE firm fixed effects, 
for instance, will absorb all observable and measured factors that remain stable within PE firms 
over time (i.e., stage focus, geographical focus, location GP, industry focus and vintage year, 
described above). Interestingly, they also control for unmeasured factors and/or unobservable 
factors that remain stable within PE firms over time.  
This approach allows us to further control for alternative explanations besides our focus 
on how performance signals of different strengths influence resource mobilization. For instance, 
preexisting inter-firm ties with LPs may influence resource mobilization, just like GPs‘ 
preexisting ties and human capital (e.g., Hallen, 2008). PE firm-level fixed effects control for 
preexisting LP characteristics even when they are not measured. Indeed, we focus on the ability 
of a first-time PE fund to raise a follow-on fund and once such a first-time fund is formed (as is 
the case for all funds in our sample), the identity of the LPs does not change over its lifetime 
(Sahlman, 1990), i.e., no new LPs are added or existing LPs are removed. Moreover, PE firm 
fixed effects also control for the characteristics of GPs that established the fund (e.g., GPs‘ 
education, previous experience and relationships) because the identity of these GPs does not 
change over the lifetime of the fund. In addition, hires and/or replacements in the GP team 
managing first-time PE funds are extremely rare over the funds‘ lifetime (note, moreover, that 
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50% of our PE firms already raise a second fund after 3 years). One of the LPs we interviewed 
confirmed and further highlighted that it is difficult to draw inferences from new GPs‘ human 
capital. While a GP might have been involved in a successful PE fund before, much information 
asymmetry remains about the role of that specific GP, relative to the other partners, in the success 
of this previous PE fund. Finally, it is also noteworthy that because all GPs raised a first-time 
fund, we reduce the possibility that some lack ―basic‖ human capital or social capital that 
hampers their follow-on fundraising abilities (e.g., Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012).  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
In Table 1, we provide details on the time-invariant characteristics of the first-time PE funds in 
our sample. Roughly 46% of PE firms raised a follow-on fund during the study period 
(unreported statistics show the average (median) PE firm does so after 4 (3) years). The mean 
realized performance of the first-time PE funds at the end of their economic lifetime equals 
132%. Unreported statistics show that this number is significantly higher for those first-time PE 
firms that were able to raise a follow-on fund, relative to those that did not raise a follow-on fund 
(151.42% vs. 110.39%, p = 0.041). The mean first-time PE fund size is about 333 million dollars. 
The majority of first-time PE funds in our sample are buyout funds and have a geographical 
investment focus on the US. Over 60% of GPs in our sample are also located in the US. First-
time PE funds primarily focus on investments in business and industrial products/services, life 
sciences, and information and communication technologies. Consistent with our sample selection 
criteria, the vintage years of the first-time PE funds are between 1999 and 2007.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 In Table 2, we provide descriptive statistics and correlations on the time-varying 
variables. While 46% of PE firms raised a follow-on fund during the study period (as shown 
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above), Table 2 shows that raising a follow-on fund is a relatively infrequent event at 7% of firm-
year observations. Bivariate correlations suggest that realized performance and unrealized 
performance are negatively correlated. Unrealized performance is positively correlated with 
media attention, but we do not find a significant correlation between realized performance and 
media attention. Unsurprisingly, PE fund age is positively correlated with realized performance, 
negatively correlated with unrealized performance, and positively correlated with called capital. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Signal Strength: Unrealized Performance, Realized Performance, and Eventual Realized 
Performance 
We have argued that unrealized performance is a weak signal while realized performance is a 
strong signal, i.e. that realized performance at the end of a fund‘s economic lifetime (or the 
unobservable firm quality) is more strongly correlated with realized than with unrealized 
performance at the time of fundraising.  
Table 3 reports evidence on the signal strength of realized and unrealized performance 
controlling for a range of other variables. In Model 1, using the eventual realized performance at 
the end of the fund‘s economic lifetime (i.e., when all funds have been redistributed to the LPs) 
as dependent variable, we find that for any 1% higher unrealized performance, the expected 
eventual realized performance will be only approximately 0.14% higher.
11
 For any 1% higher 
realized performance, the expected eventual realized performance will be approximately 0.47% 
higher. The coefficient of unrealized performance is also significantly lower than the coefficient 
of realized performance (at p < 0.001). In Model 2, using the eventual realized performance at the 
                                                          
11
 We cannot include a model with PE firm fixed effects because the dependent variable (eventual realized 
performance) shows no variation within PE firms. Below, we focus on an alternative dependent variable (i.e., 
eventual realized performance minus the realized performance that is already locked-in). This dependent variable 
does vary within PE firms and hence we can also report a model including PE firm fixed effects as we do below.  
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end of the fund‘s economic lifetime minus the realized performance already locked-in, we find 
that for any 1% higher unrealized performance, the expected eventual realized performance 
(excluding the realized performance that was already locked-in) will be approximately 0.65% 
higher. Finally, in Model 3, we use the same dependent variable as in Model 2 but additionally 
include PE firm fixed effects. We find that for any 1% increase in unrealized performance within 
a first-time PE fund, the expected eventual realized performance (excluding the realized 
performance that was already locked-in) will be approximately 0.55% higher.
12
 Note that when 
realized performance increases within a PE fund this will fully contribute to its eventual realized 
performance, while for an increase in unrealized performance just over half of the increase will 
eventually get realized. 
Overall, unrealized performance is correlated with eventual realized performance, but 
only moderately so. In particular, the analyses confirm that unrealized performance is a weaker 
signal than realized performance.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Hypotheses Tests 
In Table 4, we report the results of our multivariate Linear Probability Models with PE firm fixed 
effects and with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, clustered at the PE firm level. In 
Model 1, we only include the control variables. In Model 2, we add the independent variables 
(i.e., unrealized performance and realized performance) and the moderator variable (i.e., media 
attention). In Model 3, we include the interaction between unrealized performance and media 
attention. In Model 4, we include the interaction between realized performance and media 
attention. Model 5 is the full model. 
                                                          
12
 It is also interesting to note that in unreported tests the interaction between unrealized performance and media 
attention was not statistically significant. 
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Hypothesis 1 stated that higher unrealized performance of first-time PE funds would 
increase the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. Model 2 shows a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the unrealized performance of first-time PE funds (β = 0.022; p < 
0.01) and the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. This result is also confirmed in the other 
models. In terms of economic significance, these findings suggest that when taking all other 
values at their mean level, moving from low unrealized performance (mean – 1 S.D.) to high 
unrealized performance (mean + 1 S.D.) increases the probability of raising a follow-on fund 
from 4.4% to 10.4%. Overall, we find supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1.  
 Hypothesis 2 stated that the impact of higher unrealized performance of first-time PE 
funds on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund would be weaker than the impact of realized 
performance on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. Model 2 shows a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the realized performance of first-time PE funds (β = 
0.035; p < 0.01) and the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. This effect is economically 
significant as well. Taking all other values at their mean level, moving from low realized 
performance (mean – 1 S.D.) to high realized performance (mean + 1 S.D.) increases the 
probability of raising a follow-on fund from 0.1% to 14.1%. A qualitative comparison of the 
coefficients suggests that the effect of unrealized performance is smaller than the effect of 
realized performance. However, while qualitative comparisons of the coefficients are instructive, 
they do not provide statistical evidence for our hypothesis. Using the lincom command in Stata, 
which allows for testing the difference between coefficients of different variables in the same 
model (see also Ertug and Castellucci, 2013; Vanacker and Forbes, 2016; Wade et al., 2006), we 
fail to find a statistically significant difference between both coefficients (p = 0.286). Thus, we 
fail to find statistical support for Hypothesis 2. 
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 Hypothesis 3 stated that media attention would positively moderate the relationship 
between higher unrealized performance of first-time PE funds and the likelihood of raising a 
follow-on fund. In Model 3, we find that the interaction term between unrealized performance 
and media attention is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.011; p < 0.01). Figure 1 
graphically illustrates the interaction effect. This figure shows that for PE firms with low media 
attention (mean – 1 S.D.) and taking all other variables at their mean level, moving from low 
unrealized performance (mean – 1 S.D.) to high unrealized performance (mean + 1 S.D.) 
increases the probability of raising a follow-on fund from 2.1% to 5.1%, thus increasing the 
probability of raising a second fund 2.45-fold. However, for PE firms with high media attention 
(mean + 1 S.D.) moving from low unrealized performance (mean – 1 S.D.) to high unrealized 
performance (mean + 1 S.D.) increases the probability of raising a follow on fund from 5.4% to 
16.2%, thus increasing the probability of raising a second fund 3-fold. These effects are clearly 
also economically significant. Overall, we find supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3. 
[Include Figure 1 about here] 
 Finally, Hypothesis 4 stated that media attention would more positively moderate the 
relationship between higher unrealized performance of first-time funds and the likelihood of 
raising a follow-on fund than the relationship between realized performance and the likelihood of 
raising a follow-on fund. Consistent with this idea, a visual inspection shows that, in Model 3, the 
interaction between unrealized performance and media attention is positive and significant (β = 
0.011; p < 0.01), while in Model 4 the interaction between realized performance and media 
attention is negative and not statistically significant (β = -0.005; p > 0.10). These findings are 
also consistent with those in Model 5, the full model. Using the lincom command in Stata, we 
examine whether in Model 5 the interaction term between unrealized performance and media 
attention is also statistically different from the interaction term between realized performance and 
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media attention. The test is highly significant (p = 0.005), thereby providing evidence that the 
moderating effect of media attention is stronger for the relationship between unrealized 
performance and the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund than for the relationship between 
realized performance and the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. Overall, we find supporting 
evidence for Hypothesis 4. 
Robustness Tests 
We performed additional tests to examine the robustness of our findings. These tests are 
described below (detailed results are not reported but available upon request). 
 First, we used alternative media attention measures. In our sample, all PE firms manage 
their first-time fund; consequently, ―firm‖ and ―fund‖ can be used largely interchangeably. 
However, in some cases, the name of the PE firm is different from the name of its fund. In our 
primary analysis, our media attention measure was calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
number of media citations to the PE firm (plus 1) in t-1. We also used equivalent measures that 
count (a) the number of media citations to the PE fund and (b) both media citations to the PE firm 
and PE fund. These measures are positively correlated (all above 0.60). Our multivariate results 
also remain robust using these alternative measures and provide similar evaluations of our 
Hypotheses 3 and 4.  
 Second, we used an alternative econometric approach, namely a complementary log-log 
random effects model (with robust standard errors, clustered at the PE firm level) to account for 
the fact that our dependent variable is a rare event at any point in time (Coff, 2003). The 
complementary log-log model has the advantage of providing close similarity to continuous time 
models, such as the Cox regression model (Allison, 1995). The former approach, however, which 
is invariant to interval length, is more suitable relative to continuous time models because we do 
not have continuous data but rather rely on yearly data (Allison, 1995). Our multivariate results 
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also remain robust using this alternative econometric approach. Specifically, we find supporting 
evidence for Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 but fail to find evidence for Hypothesis 2. 
 Third, we reran our analysis using a subsample of 125 GPs that are located in the US, to 
ensure homogeneity in the institutional environment. Consistent with our previous findings 
related to Hypothesis 1, unrealized performance has a positive effect on the probability of raising 
a follow-on fund, although this effect is statistically insignificant. In this US sample, we do find 
evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2, that is, the effect of unrealized performance is weaker 
than the effect of realized performance. In addition, we find strong support for Hypothesis 3 and 
Hypothesis 4. Thus, insights from tests on a subsample of US-based GPs are qualitatively similar 
to the results in our main tests using a global dataset. Moreover, when in additional tests, we 
further focused on a related subsample of first-time PE funds with a geographical investment 
focus on the US, we again found virtually similar results. 
Fourth, one may argue that media attention is endogenously determined and that time-
varying unobservable characteristics influence both media attention and the unobservable 
fundraising abilities of PE managers. (Note that time-invariant unobservable factors are 
accounted for in our primary analysis using PE firm fixed effects). In other words, the ―best‖ PE 
firms may attract the most media attention, thereby causing a spurious correlation between media 
attention and the ability to raise a second fund. However, if this were true one would expect 
media attention to correlate with realized performance as well, whereas our correlation matrix 
(Table 2) suggests that media attention is weakly correlated with unrealized performance but not 
with realized performance. Moreover, Table 3 shows that PE firms that attract more media 
attention do not exhibit higher eventual realized performance (at the end of the funds‘ lifetime). 
In fact, Model 3 with PE firm fixed effects shows that additional media attention is related to 
lower eventual realized performance. Thus, these findings suggest no correlation (or a negative 
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correlation) between media attention and eventual realized performance, which makes 
endogenous explanations related to our Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 unlikely. Moreover, our 
primary interest is not in the main effect of media attention but in its interaction with unrealized 
and realized performance, respectively. For interaction terms, standard econometric approaches 
are ―often at least as credible as instrumental variable (IV) inference‖ particularly in the 
commonplace case where the validity of IVs is questionable (Bun and Harrison, 2014: 2-3). 
Finally, to account for the concern that interaction terms in fixed effects models may no longer 
reflect within-firm effects, we estimated a ―double-demeaned‖ estimator of the interaction 
between unrealized performance and media attention (Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran, 2018). 
Our results remained robust (i.e., the coefficient remained positive and significant).   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
It is well-established that new firms can attract resources more readily when they communicate 
signals that credibly convey their unobservable quality. However, we know little about how 
multiple simultaneous signals of different strengths influence resource provision decisions. 
Indeed, much of the signaling literature has focused on signals that are (implicitly) assumed to be 
strong. Moreover, this literature has often assumed that prospective resource providers attend to 
and evaluate these signals in a social vacuum, independently of the social context. In this paper, 
we addressed these common assumptions in the signaling literature. We drew on a sociocognitive 
perspective to develop hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of weak versus strong signals and 
the role of the media, an important information intermediary in a firm‘s social context, on the 
effectiveness of such distinct signals. We empirically tested our hypotheses using unique 
longitudinal data on the fundraising activities of 205 first-time PE funds. Our research context is 
one where informational asymmetry problems and uncertainty are especially acute and where the 
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inability of PE managers to raise a second fund entails that they will ultimately be forced to exit 
the PE business. 
Our findings are broadly in line with our hypotheses. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we 
find that first-time PE funds with higher unrealized performance, a relatively weak signal, are 
more likely to raise a follow-on fund. While we find that the economic impact of unrealized 
performance is weaker than that of realized performance, we fail to find statistical evidence (in 
the full sample) that the effectiveness of unrealized performance is weaker than the effectiveness 
of realized performance, i.e. the stronger signal. Thus, we find no statistical support for 
Hypothesis 2. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find evidence that the relationship between 
unrealized performance and fundraising is much stronger for PE firms that attract significant 
media attention. Moreover, consistent with Hypothesis 4, the effectiveness of realized 
performance for fundraising is less affected by the media attention PE firms attract than that of 
unrealized performance.  
The lack of statistical support for Hypothesis 2 in the full sample, which focuses on the 
average effectiveness of strong versus weak signals, can be explained by the results related to our 
moderation Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis argues that the effectiveness of weak signals depends 
on the media attention firms receive. Our findings confirm that for new PE firms with limited 
media attention, the effect of unrealized performance is statistically much weaker than the effect 
of realized performance. Moreover, it is worth noting that we find both economically and 
statistically significant effects that support Hypothesis 2 in the subsample of US-based PE funds. 
Overall, these findings suggest that the limited support for Hypothesis 2 may be due to contextual 
factors that make average comparisons (in samples with PE firms that attract fundamentally 
different levels of attention from the media and samples in which there is important geographical 
diversity) between unrealized and realized performance challenging. However, our strong 
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evidence for Hypothesis 3 and 4 suggests that a differentiation between signals of varying 
strength remains important to understand the effectiveness of these distinct signals. 
Contributions to Theory 
Our findings contribute to the signaling literature in several ways. First, past studies of signaling 
have generally not accounted for the possibility that distinct signals may differ in strength. If 
anything, it is often (implicitly) assumed that the signals under investigation are strong signals 
(i.e., that they are significantly correlated with unobservable quality), although this assumption is 
rarely tested. Indeed, after an extensive review of the signaling literature, Bergh and colleagues 
(2014: 1347) observed that none of the studies in their review ―empirically incorporated signal 
confirmation‖ thereby leaving many potential research avenues under-explored. In our context, 
signal confirmation would entail that the signals are shown to be (differently) correlated with the 
new PE firm‘s ability to generate returns. We investigate two distinct performance signals (e.g., 
Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), where we argue that realized performance is a stronger signal, 
while unrealized performance is a weaker signal. We also provide empirical evidence for the 
difference in signal strength by showing that realized performance has a stronger correlation with 
the eventual return realized at the end of a fund‘s lifetime relative to unrealized performance.  
 Having established that our two performance signals differ significantly in strength, this 
forms the basis for a set of broader contributions that advance a sociocognitive view on signaling. 
First, traditional signaling theory has usually focused on how a specific signal may create a 
separating equilibrium between high-quality and low-quality firms (e.g., Spence, 1973). 
However, in the management domain, it is well established that firms often convey multiple 
signals simultaneously. Signaling theory, however, remains rather silent on how resource 
providers may attend to and evaluate multiple signals (e.g., Drover et al., 2018), especially when 
these signals are of different strengths and thus create a situation where they could be ―rank 
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ordered‖. Our study is important because it shows that weak signals can also influence resource 
provision decisions and provides an explanation of why such signals matter, even when 
controlling for the availability of strong signals.  
Second, prospective resource providers are often assumed to attend to and evaluate 
signals conveyed by firms in a social vacuum. Sensing this limitation, Connelly and colleagues 
(2011: 62) observed that the ―signaling environment is on the whole an underresearched aspect of 
signaling theory‖. Our study shows that the effects of weak signals, in particular, are significantly 
influenced by firms‘ media attention. By doing so, our study contributes to an increasing body of 
literature that shows that the value of signaling is contingent upon various factors, including basic 
firm characteristics (Stuart et al., 1999), the availability of other signals (Ozmel et al., 2013; 
Plummer et al., 2016), market conditions (Gulati and Higgins, 2003) and time (Pollock and 
Gulati, 2007). More specifically, we point to a new dimension of the contingent value of 
signaling, namely a firm‘s media attention, which determines the effectiveness of weak signals.  
Our findings are in line with other influential work taking a sociocognitive perspective 
that has focused on how the media affects attention allocation towards firms and affects the 
evaluation of firms, thereby influencing resource provision decisions (Petkova et al., 2013; 
Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Pollock et al., 2008). Studies in this domain, however, have often 
focused on the media‘s legitimization role, irrespective of the signals firms convey. In our study, 
we have demonstrated that, while media attention indeed has a direct effect on firms, the 
effectiveness of signaling and media attention are also interrelated. Our study provides the basis 
for a theoretical integration of signaling literature with work on the role of information 
intermediaries, two streams of research that have remained largely unconnected (e.g., Pollock and 
Rindova, 2003). 
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
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Our findings suggest that scholars could draw further on a sociocognitive perspective to better 
understand how and when resource provisions decisions are more or less influenced by different 
signals (e.g., Connelly et al., 2011). First, future research could examine the generalizability of 
our findings on the effectiveness of weak signals and the effect of media attention on their 
effectiveness in other contexts than the PE context. To do so, scholars are aided by the fact that 
firms in other entrepreneurial settings also often communicate their generally limited track record 
of past realized performance (e.g., Hallen, 2008) and their prospects for future performance, i.e. 
unrealized performance (e.g., Kirsch et al., 2009). 
Second, given our focus on unrealized performance, ample opportunities also exist to 
examine other types of weak signals, for example, announcements about future actions. Future 
research could also draw on a cognitive perspective to unravel whether different sets of 
prospective resource providers attend differently to signals of different strengths (e.g., capital 
providers versus employees). While the resource mobilization and signaling literature streams 
have largely focused on the mobilization of financial resources (Clough et al., 2019), firms need 
to mobilize other types of resources as well, and different types of resource providers may 
differently attend to and evaluate different types of signals (e.g., Vanacker and Forbes, 2016). In 
our study, we focused on capital providers to PE funds, which are generally sophisticated players 
with significant financial experience. If weak signals influence such sophisticated investors, one 
could expect the effects to be even stronger for less sophisticated resource providers. However, 
all these issues remain subject to future research. 
 Third, while the distinction between ―attention‖ and ―evaluation‖ is well recognized in 
sociocognitive studies (Fiske and Taylor 1991), it is empirically challenging to separate both 
phases in decision making. Indeed, management research has often theorized on both phases but, 
just like in our study, researchers often do not separately examine prospective resource providers 
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consideration set and their evaluation process. Rather, empirical research including ours often 
focuses directly on the outcome, that is, the resource provision decision. This limitation opens up 
important avenues for future research. Particularly, management scholars could pay more specific 
attention to these intermediary phases. In doing so, the marketing literature on consideration set 
formation (e.g., Hauser, 2014) might be particularly valuable to further increase our 
understanding of how firms can enter into the consideration set of prospective resource providers. 
 Finally, an implicit assumption in our study is that new PE firms want to raise a follow-on 
fund. This assumption is commonplace because PE managers need to raise a follow-on fund to 
remain in business. However, there is a possibility that exceptional situations such as partner 
conflicts or departures may push firms to decide not to raise a follow-on fund. An important 
avenue for future research is to investigate how such factors may influence the decision to raise a 
follow-on fund.  
Practical Implications 
Our study also has implications for practice. Firms should appreciate the potential consequences 
of signals of different strengths, and particularly weak signals, for resource mobilization.  
Firms are generally advised to convey strong signals to resource providers in order to 
facilitate resource mobilization. These strong signals could include affiliations with prominent 
affiliates. However, this advice often confronts firms with a ―chicken-and-egg‖ conundrum. How 
can firms attract prominent affiliates in the first place, when these prominent affiliates also rely 
on strong signals when making their affiliation decisions? Our findings suggest that in certain 
cases, firms may be able to draw the attention of prospective resource providers to their firms and 
be evaluated positively through conveying relatively weak signals. Such weak signals may be 
more readily available to new firms with high-quality prospects than strong signals.  
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The possibility that weak signals also foster resource mobilization may be a particularly 
attractive feature when firms have significant potential that is not yet realized. Indeed, in an 
attempt to show realized performance (a strong signal) early-on, firms may leave money on the 
table (e.g., Gompers, 1996). Rather, firms can also convey weaker signals such as their 
unrealized performance or performance potential. When effective, this may allow firms to reduce 
their costs related to signaling, to a situation where firms can enter into the consideration set of 
prospective resource providers and let the latter bear the cost of due diligence to examine the 
credibility of those weak signals in more detail.  
However, our findings also show that the effect of weak signals is not ―automatic‖. 
Specifically, weak signals become much more effective when firms have attracted the attention 
of the media. While some of this media attention might be out of the control of new firms, they 
can also proactively influence the media attention they attract to some degree, for example by 
speaking at industry events or engaging in customer education efforts (Petkova, 2012; Petkova et 
al., 2013). Moreover, in our analysis of media reports, we noticed that some of these relate to 
simple expositions on the state of the industry the firm is in. While these media reports might be 
viewed as trivial, our results suggest that they can have profound effects on firms‘ subsequent 
search for key resources.  
Concluding Note 
In closing, drawing on a sociocognitive perspective, we have investigated the effectiveness of 
signals of different strengths for new firm resource mobilization and how their effectiveness 
depends on the attention new firms attracted from the media, an important information 
intermediary in a firm‘s social context. We hope this study encourages additional research 
examining the effects of different types of signals and their contingent value for new firms 
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Characteristics of the 205 New PE Funds 
 
Obs. Mean S.D. 
Raising a follow-on fund 205 0.46 — 
Eventual realized performance a 133 132.29 140.26 
Fund size 205 333.07 481.56 
Stage focus 
   Venture capital 205 0.42 — 
Buyout 205 0.58 — 
Geographical focus 
   US 205 0.63 — 
Europe 205 0.25 — 
Rest of world 205 0.12 — 
Location GP 
   US 205 0.61 — 
Europe 205 0.23 — 
Rest of world 205 0.16 — 
Industry focus 
   Agriculture and chemical materials 205 0.02 — 
Business and industrial products/services 205 0.46 — 
Consumer products/services and retail 205 0.24 — 
Energy and environment 205 0.15 — 
Financial services 205 0.15 — 
Information and communication tech 205 0.35 — 
Life sciences 205 0.39 — 
Other industries 205 0.22 — 
Vintage year 
   1999 205 0.06 — 
2000 205 0.12 — 
2001 205 0.11 — 
2002 205 0.07 — 
2003 205 0.07 — 
2004 205 0.14 — 
2005 205 0.08 — 
2006 205 0.11 — 
2007 205 0.16 — 
        
 
a 
The descriptive statistics of the untransformed variable are reported here. The natural logarithm of 




Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  
Obs. Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Raising a follow-on fund 1,057 0.07 — 1.00 
      2 Unrealized performance a 1,057 74.26 88.14 0.15 1.00 
     3 Realized performance a 1,057 49.04 108.45 0.02 -0.40 1.00 
    4 Media attention a 1,057 9.55 26.63 0.05 0.11 -0.05 1.00 
   5 Fund age 1,057 5.38 3.73 -0.13 -0.59 0.66 -0.09 1.00 
  6 Called capital 1,057 0.75 0.81 -0.01 0.00 0.35 -0.02 0.21 1.00 
 7 S&P500 return 1,057 8.04 17.78 -0.01 -0.11 0.15 -0.07 0.26 0.04 1.00 
8 PE on GDP 1,057 0.87 0.41 0.08 0.11 -0.04 0.06 -0.18 0.02 -0.33 
                        
 
 Notes. Correlations in bold are significant at p < 0.05. 
a 
The descriptive statistics of the untransformed variables are reported here. The natural logarithm of the variables are used for the 












DV: Eventual realized performance minus 
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Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered at the PE firm level, are reported in brackets.  




Linear Probability Model with PE Firm Fixed Effects Predicting the Probability of Raising 
a Second Fund 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Independent variables 
     Unrealized performance — 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 
  
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Realized performance — 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
  
[0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] 
Moderator 
     Media attention — 0.027** 0.027** 0.026** 0.026** 
  
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
Interaction effects 
     Unrealized performance — — 0.011*** — 0.009* 





Realized performance  — — — -0.005 -0.003 
   x Media attention 
   
[0.004] [0.005] 
Controls 
     Fund age 0.077*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 
 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] 
Fund age squared -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Called capital 0.027 0.008 0.010 0.005 0.008 
 
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
S&P500 return -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
PE on GDP 0.037 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 
 
[0.075] [0.072] [0.071] [0.071] [0.070] 
      PE firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Number of observations 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 
Number of PE firms 205 205 205 205 205 
Adjusted R-squared 0.265 0.287 0.289 0.288 0.289 
F-Stat 5.89*** 6.51***  6.40*** 6.33*** 6.16*** 
            
Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered at the PE firm level, are reported in brackets.  
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEWS 
We supplemented our quantitative study with three qualitative, in-depth interviews. By doing so, 
we address an observation by Wiklund, Wright, and Zahra (2019) that ―researchers increasingly 
rely on archival data in their research without ever interacting with entrepreneurs or other 
research subjects. … Such interactions are extremely valuable. Insights into the setting and 
context enable researchers to understand if their findings are reasonable and make sense, and to 
interpret the deeper meaning and usefulness of specific statistical relationships‖ (p. 427) and that 
researchers could leverage insights from practice to ―make the point, or even form the foundation 
for their theory‖ (p. 433). 
 We conducted two in-depth interviews with LPs and one with a GP (with prior experience 
as LP) during the winter of 2018/2019. Two interviewees were men, one was a woman. All 
interviewees have over ten years of experience in the PE industry, with multiple funds. One 
interviewee is currently a GP at a US-based PE firm, investing worldwide and having over $1 
billion in assets. The second interviewee is a managing director of the PE division of a financial 
institution, investing worldwide, but with a primary focus on Europe, currently managing around 
$1 billion invested in approximately 60 PE funds. The managing director has 15 years of 
experience as LP in PE funds. The third interviewee is an investment manager in a European 
fund-of-funds with currently around $200 million invested in over 20 PE funds. The interviewee 
has 10 years of experience as fund investor.  
The interviews were semi-structured and lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Two 
interviews were carried out face-to-face, whereas one was a telephone interview. We asked the 
LPs to provide insights into how they identify and evaluate first-time PE funds that are in 
fundraising mode, but also asked them to reflect upon their experiences with previous PE funds 
they had worked for, and to share their views on standard practices in the PE industry. We asked 
the GP to explain how he creates interest from LPs when fundraising, and how they then conduct 
their due diligence. To avoid interviewer bias, the face-to-face interviews were conducted by two 
of the authors. Further, the interviews were transcribed and analyzed by all of the authors.  
In line with recent research that used quotes to bring life to theoretical considerations 
(e.g., Souitaris et al., 2019), we cannot claim to have followed a formal qualitative methodology. 
As it is particularly difficult to gain access to LPs, and especially to discuss topics which are at 
the core of their firm‘s strategy such as investing, we had to highly rely upon our networks in 
order to conduct these interviews, which took place under strict confidentiality. Nevertheless, the 
interviewees do reflect some heterogeneity in terms of role, gender, experience, location and 
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